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Abstract – A dynamic agent model is introduced with an annual random wealth multiplicative
process followed by taxes paid according to a linear wealth-dependent tax rate. If poor agents
pay higher tax rates than rich agents, eventually all wealth becomes concentrated in the hands of
a single agent. By contrast, if poor agents are subject to lower tax rates, the economic collective
process continues forever.
Introduction. – Inequality within human societies is
nowadays, more than ever, an important issue [1]. Histor-
ical data were collected and analysed in a recent, now fa-
mous study [2], concerning individuals, regions, countries,
etc. Within this general frame, progressive taxation (rich
people paying higher tax rates) is proposed in order to mit-
igate the observed tendency towards wealth concentration.
On the other hand, some argue the contrary, rich people
paying less taxes, because somehow their wealth benefits
the whole society (the trickle-down argument). Here, we
adopt the strategy of summing up the whole wealth of a
population formed by a set of agents n = 1, 2 . . .N , and
studying the time evolution of the share wn each individ-
ual owns of this total wealth. A simple model is studied via
numerical simulation as well as via an analytic, mean-field
approach. The model is based on two general ingredients,
annual profits and taxation. We focus attention on the
final steady state distribution of wealth. If the share of
some particular agent approaches the maximum possible
value wmax = 1 (this possibility is called collapse), the
wealth of the entire population lies in hands of a single
agent. Economic evolution stops, as this is an absorbing
state of the dynamics. This kind of dynamic transition
towards possible absorbing states is a recent research field
[3], where models as the present one are used in order
to study such phenomena as extinction, epidemics, opin-
ion dynamics, vaccination, prevention of fires, etc. In the
present case, the general strategy of following the wealth
shares (instead of wealth values themselves) distinguishes
this study from similar models. This subject was reviewed
in [4], describing the different strategies adopted in these
models in order to represent the economic dynamics of
a society. The simplest one is the pairwise transaction,
where two randomly chosen agents exchange money ac-
cording to some conservative rule. The inclusion of some
external entity (a bank or some reservoir of money) allows
the inclusion of debts, the total money of the population
is no longer conserved. The concept of wealth instead of
money considers other individual property, besides money.
The total population wealth is not conserved, since the an-
nual production of each agent can increase (or decrease)
its wealth. This ingredient is modeled by multiplying the
current wealth of each agent by a random factor in the
pioneering work of Bouchaud and Me´zard [5]. We provide
in Ref. [6] an incomplete and somewhat arbitrary list of
works related to this issue; the interested reader may also
wish to consult the works cited in these references. All of
them follow the dynamic evolution of the wealth distribu-
tion among agents, not the distribution of wealth shares
here introduced. Concerning taxes, they were treated in
[5] as uniformly applied to each agent independent of its
current wealth, the possibility of regressive or progressive
tax rates is also introduced here.
Stochastic, Computer Simulated Version. –
Consider a population of N independent agents, each
one owning a positive wealth Wn
1. The total population
wealth is S =
∑
nWn. The share of this total wealth
1 The set of wealths is always considered in decreasing order, the
so-called Zipf distribution, so index n corresponds to the rank of
each agent, not to the specific agent itself.
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owned by agent n is wn =Wn/S. Consider also the mon-
etary unit taken as the total wealth S = 1. Using this unit,
wealths Wn or wealth shares wn are the same quantities.
The dynamic evolution consists of four steps during each
“year” (time step). Step I is a multiplicative process with
randomness. Each wealth wn is multiplied by a random,
positive factor fn chosen from a fixed probability distri-
bution. The result is a new set of W ′n = fnwn and the
corresponding shares w′n = W
′
n/S
′, where S′ =
∑
nW
′
n.
Second, step II, payment of taxes at the end-of-year, ac-
cording to a tax rate that is a linear function of wealth,
W ′′n = (1−A−pw
′
n)W
′
n, where A and p are fixed parame-
ters obeying the restrictions 0 < A < 1 and 0 < A+p < 1.
Step III is a partial redistribution procedure: a fraction
R of the total collected taxes is uniformly redistributed
among all N agents,W ′′′n =W
′′
n +R
∑
n(A+pw
′
n)W
′
n/N .
Numerically, it provides the advantage of restricting from
below the dynamic variables wn, so that they are always
strictly positive. This restriction is mandatory, otherwise
agents reaching wn = 0 would be removed from the game
permanently. The interesting limiting case, however, is
R → 0, as we shall see. Finally, step IV is the renormal-
isation of wealths by a common factor, w′′′n = W
′′′
n /S
′′′,
where S′′′ =
∑
nW
′′′
n . This step can be interpreted as
a simple redefinition of the monetary unit, always kept
equal to the total wealth at the beginning of the next
year. After this four-step procedure, the new year starts
from the set of w′′′n , and so on. Besides the focus on wealth
shares instead of wealths, another difference of the current
model compared with [5] is the presence of the non-linear
(quadratic in Wn) term in the tax paid (for p 6= 0).
Anticipating the result, in the quoted limit of no-
redistribution, R → 0, there is an absorbing state tran-
sition between two possible final steady states, depending
on the adopted W -dependent tax rate rule. Collapsed
phase occurs when poor agents pay higher tax rates than
rich agents, p < 0, resulting in one particular agent own-
ing all the wealth at the end, w1 = wmax → 1 for the
richest agent, wn → 0 for all others. The economy ceases
to evolve. Otherwise, an active phase occurs when rich
agents pay higher tax rates than poor agents, p > 0, the
whole economy evolves forever with the wealth distributed
among agents. Economic evolution survives. Being a sim-
ple global rescaling, parameter A plays no essential role.
It is used only to assure all tax rates are positive. Also,
the same model with taxes applied only to the annual
gains (instead of accumulated wealths) exhibits the same
transition.
The same scenario, transition to a collapsed state for
p < 0, is observed with numerous alternative probabil-
ity distributions for the multiplicative factors fn adopted
in step I. A simple possibility is to double the current
wealth Wn (fn = 2) with probability 50%, and otherwise
leave it unaltered (fn = 1). Figure 1 shows the result for
this simple choice, in a population of N = 1, 000 agents.
Many other rules for selecting the multiplicative factors
fn were tested, all of them giving the same general re-
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Figure 1: Sum of all wealth shares but the richest agent as a
function of time. The central red curve corresponds to p = 0,
the critical situation. Black points show the averages in powers-
of-2 increasing intervals (bins) of the same data, exhibiting a
clear long-term linear behaviour in this log × log plot, thus a
power law time dependence. Out from the central curve, green
curves correspond to p = ±0.005, blue curves to p = ±0.01,
purple to p = ±0.02 and light blue to p = ±0.03.
sult, a dynamically-induced transition at the critical point
p = pc = 0. Notice the transition is indeed critical, as
exhibited by the asymptotic power law, central curve in
Figure 1.
Being a multiplicative process, the natural choice for
order parameter to describe the transition is − logwmax,
which vanishes in the collapsed phase, p < 0. We compute
this order parameter through a time averaging procedure
followed by a sample average. Each sample corresponds to
an initially random distribution of wealths, starting from
which the above-defined dynamic rule is processed dur-
ing T years. For each n, the time average of logwn is
then taken during the last T/2 years, where T is large
enough to assure convergence (we adopted T = 32M, large
enough within our numerical precision). The same process
is repeated by generating S different initial conditions (we
adopted S = 8). All time averages are then sample av-
eraged, resulting in a final list << − logwn >> with N
entries and the corresponding error bars. Figure 2 shows
one such distribution2.
The order parameter is
m =<< − logw1 >> , (1)
the first entry of the quoted list. It is shown as a func-
tion of p in Figure 3 (symbols at the main plot), within
the active phase p > 0 (for p < 0, the result is always
m = 0 as it should be). Near the transition point, the
2All algebraic operations were performed within a 113-bit man-
tissa, by multiplying each fraction wn by 260 and storing it in an
integer variable with 60 bits plus an ordinary double precision vari-
able with a 53-bit mantissa. The resulting numerical accuracy on the
sum of wealths one needs in order to perform the annual renormali-
sation of the monetary unit is bounded above 10−34 (2−113). Were
we to use simply a double precision variable, the accuracy would
drop to 10−15 (2−53). That is why we restrict the plot to wealth
shares larger than 10−34.
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Figure 2: Steady state distribution of wealth shares as a func-
tion of the rank n = 1, 2 . . . N (logarithm base 10). Error bars
are smaller than the symbols. Here, N = 1, 000 and p = 0.045.
order parameter m follows a power law m ∝ pβ , with
β ≈ 0.83 estimated by fitting Figure 3 (bottom right in-
set) for p ≤ 0.01. Compared with the corresponding crit-
ical exponents β normally observed in equilibrium phase
transitions, this value is unusually high. However, equi-
librium thermodynamic concepts (like inequalities among
critical exponents) cannot be directly applied here. The
traditional notation β is used only by analogy.
For completeness, it is interesting to provide some kind
of external field acting on all agents on the same footing.
The field is expected to smooth the singularities at the
transition point in the same way an external magnetic field
acting on a ferromagnetic system does. Redistribution
plays the role of such an external field h, defined as follows:
1
h
= − logR . (2)
Full redistribution corresponds to h → ∞, whereas the
no-redistribution limit where the transition occurs corre-
sponds3 to h → 0. Figure 3 shows smooth curves ob-
tained for some values of h. Moreover, at the transition
point p = 0, the order parameter m follows another power
law m ∝ h1/δ, Figure 3 (upper left inset). From it, one
can estimate δ ≈ 1.03. Indeed, δ = 1 is expected by the
model definition itself, since there are no interactions be-
tween agents. Only the annual redefinition of monetary
unit correlates agents to each other. This is different from
interacting systems usually treated in equilibrium phase
transition studies, where the various elements behave col-
lectively through some prescribed interaction, thus dis-
playing a non-linear response m to the external stimulus
h: δ would be larger than unity in such a case.
3In principle, in order to avoid null wealths and keeping the mean-
ing of the system size N , one should set a very small h > 0, sim-
ilar to equilibrium phase transitions where some residual external
field is necessary in order to break the symmetry in finite systems.
When some particular wealth share wn becomes smaller than 10−318
during the process, it is replaced by a copy of the previous one,
wn−1. Thus, the no-redistribution case does not correspond exactly
to R = 0, but is equivalent to set R ≈ N × 10−318.
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Figure 3: Order parameter (w1 refers to the richest agent)
as a function of p. Symbols at the main plot are obtained
without redistribution, i.e. external field h→ 0, exhibiting the
characteristic singularity at the critical point p = 0. Again,
error bars are smaller than the symbols. Smooth, continuous
lines correspond to finite external fields h = 0.05, h = 0.03
and h = 0.01 from top down. Insets show the same quantity
in log × log plots as function of p > 0 (without redistribution,
bottom right) or h (at the critical point p = 0, upper left): the
straight lines confirm the critical character of the transition.
Here N = 10, 000, the same points are reproduced for N =
1, 000, within the error bars.
Deterministic, Mean Field Approximation. –
Let’s restrict the treatment to the no-redistribution case
where the transition occurs, skipping step III. At time t
the fraction of agents whose wealth shares fall between w
and w + dw is dw gt(w), where∫ 1
0
dw gt(w) = 1 (3)
comes from agent counting normalisation, relative to the
(large) fixed number N of agents. Another normalisation,
S = N < w >t= N
∫ 1
0
dww gt(w) = 1 (4)
corresponds to the total wealth considered as monetary
unit. Symbol < . . . >t indicates the average over the
current configuration, all agents, at time t. Instead of
gt(w), let’s define the ranking function
rt(w) = N
∫ 1
w
dw′ gt(w
′) , (5)
which is the already quoted Zipf distribution of wealth
shares (such as Figure 2, with interchanged horizontal and
vertical axes).
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Consider P (f) the arbitrary but fixed probability dis-
tribution for the multiplicative factors fn. After steps I,
II and IV, the new ranking function is
rt+1(w) =
∫
df P (f) rt(x/f) , (6)
where
x =
(1−A) < f >
2p
(
1−
√
1−
4pFt w
1−A
)
, (6a)
< . . . > means the average under the fixed probability
distribution P (f) and
Ft = 1− p
< f2 >
(1−A) < f >2
< w2 >t
< w >t
. (6b)
The averages < w >t and < w
2 >t can be determined
directly from the ranking function, instead of gt(w).
The reasoning leading to equations (6) is based on solv-
ing backwards relationW ′′ = (1−A−pW ′/S′)W ′, within
the mean field assumption S′ = < f >, i.e. after step I
the new total wealth S′ is replaced by its average < f >
over all possible choices of multiplicative factors. Then, we
equate the fraction dW ′′ g(W ′′) of agents whose wealths
are between W ′′ and W ′′ + dW ′′ after taxes to the cor-
responding fraction dW ′ g(W ′) of agents whose wealths
were between W ′ and W ′ + dW ′ before taxes.
At this point, after applying equation (6), the up-to-now
continuous ranking function should be discretised along
the r axis in N channels, before starting the next year.
This procedure is necessary in order to preserve the sys-
tem size N , as already discussed. The plot r×w is divided
in N horizontal strips with equal heights, each strip then
replaced by a rectangle with the same area. Dynamic evo-
lution, equation (6) plus discretisation, is then repeated
until convergence.
In practice, we divide the w axis in M channels (M >>
N), assigning some tentative guess for the final steady
state ranking function r(w) (any monotonically decreas-
ing form between r(0) = N and r(1) = 0). Taking a
particular value w, equation (6) is applied and the result-
ing r replaces the original r(w). The process is repeated
for all channels, again and again, until convergence (the
so-called relaxation method). The result is as expected:
wmax = 1 for p < 0.
Returning to the simple case of a binary distribution of
multiplicative factors (fn = 1 or 2 with probabilities 50%),
the very same mean field approach can be reformulated as
follows.
a) Starting from the current wealth shares wn at time t,
n = 1, 2 . . .N , one first performs a copy of them, doubling
all values of the copy.
b) Now, one has 2N wealths Wn instead of the original
N , summing to 3 instead of unity. Then, one applies taxes
to these wealths.
c) After that, the resulting 2N wealths are listed in
decreasing order.
d) Finally, one restores the original population N : the
average between the first and the second largest wealths is
assigned to the first agent, the average between the third
and fourth wealths is assigned to the second agent, so on.
A comment about this new procedure follows. The av-
eraging step (d) highlights the mean-field character of
the current deterministic approach, compared with the
stochastic formulation where each wealth can be doubled
or not. In the stochastic version, at the critical point,
1 − wmax slowly vanishes as time goes by as shown in
Figure 1, central plot, whereas it converges to 1/2 in the
mean-field approximation generating a first-order transi-
tion gap4. The transition point p = 0, however, remains
the same.
Another comment. This simple alternative formulation
bypasses the ranking function; its role is automatically
performed by the ordering step (c) applied to the set of
2N wealths.
Still another comment. One needs only two copies of
the wealth shares, step (a), in the particular case when
one adopts only two possible wealth multiplicative factors,
here 1 or 2. In general, one needs one copy for each pos-
sible wealth multiplicative factor fn, taking into account
their probability distribution P (f). In this case, the orig-
inal formulation by relaxing the ranking function may be
more economical for computer calculations. Anyway, the
two approaches are completely equivalent.
Conclusions. – The wealth distribution of a popula-
tion is submitted to a multiplicative process followed by re-
gressive or progressive taxation, where tax rates are higher
for poor than rich agents or vice-versa, respectively. In
the long term, regressive taxation leads to social collapse,
all wealth falls in the hands of a single agent, whereas
it remains forever distributed among agents if progressive
taxation is adopted instead. This transition is different
from that studied in previous works, for instance [5], in
which the so-called wealth condensation is the main issue,
the concentration of the entire wealth in the hands of a
finite number of agents within an otherwise infinite pop-
ulation. In some sense, without redistribution, our model
always eventually leads to such condensation, even in the
active phase. In this case, the wealths listed in decreasing
order follow an almost exponential decay, Figure 2, con-
figuring an effective finite number of agents participating
in the process (inversely proportional to the slope of plots
like Figure 2). One way to avoid such condensation is the
uniform redistribution of the collected taxes, as in [5], at
the end of each year. Doing so, uniformly redistributing a
fraction R of the collected taxes, the transition singular-
ities disappear in the same way external fields do in the
4Indeed, for p = 0 the whole list of wealth shares converges to
wn = 0.5n.
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traditional theory of equilibrium phase transitions (curves
become smooth, as shown in Figure 3).
As a final comment, we notice that progressive taxation
(p > 0) alone is not able to solve the inequality problem,
since only a finite number of agents effectively participate
of the wealth exchange game. Even for progressive tax-
ation, wealth concentration still holds, not in the hands
of a single agent but in the hands of a finite number. In
order to avoid wealth concentration, economic policy mak-
ers should not only adopt progressive taxation, but also
implement some kind of redistribution. Just after World
War II, policy makers perceived this fact, creating a set of
social programs now known as the “welfare state”.
∗ ∗ ∗
I am indebted to Evaldo Curado and Cristian Moukarzel
for helpful discussions, and to Ronald Dickman for a crit-
ical reading of the manuscipt.
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